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THE PROOF OF PATERNITY AND
THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE*
MALCOLM McDERMOTT t
S CIENTIFIC evidence of blood grouping tests has made slow prog-
ress in American courts. Landsteiner's basic discovery of the A-B-O
groups in human blood occurred over half a century ago, while Bern-
stein's determination that Mendel's laws of inheritability applied there-
to was announced some thirty years ago. The further discovery of the
independent M-N blood types by Landsteiner and Levine in 1927, and'
of the Rh-Hr types by Landsteiner and Wiener in 1940 served to ex-
tend greatly the scope of proof by blood. Yet American courts and
legislatures have until recently shown marked reluctance toward mak-
ing full use of this means science has afforded for the solution of prob-
lems of parentage and identity.
These landmarks in scientific discovery are so well known that
detailed reference thereto would be superfluous were it not that the
dates and time elements are significant. At least a year before the
announcement of Bernstein's theories in 1925, German courts,
prompted by Schiff, began to admit results of blood grouping tests as
relevant evidence in paternity suits. From then on, and particularly
after the discovery of the M-N blood types in 1927, results of such
tests were admitted in European courts in thousands of cases. Ad-
vised by their ministries of justice and other authoritative sources
of expert knowledge, courts of most European countries have welcomed
this satisfactory form of evidence, and have treated it as conclusive
when parentage of the defendant in a paternity suit is shown to be a
scientific impossibility.'
In contrast, and despite the fact that much of the pioneer work
in this field was done in the United States by the recognized experts
already named, and despite the scores of learned articles, books, and
other reports published by them and others on the subject, courts of
the United States have been slow to accord to this type of evidence
its proper status as scientific proof. Such progress as has been made
has been halting and at times marked by outright reversals. This
lag has been explained upon the ground of "inertia" on the part of
the public, the scientists, and the legal profession.2 When one surveys
* This paper was prepared for and read before, the Fourth International Congress
of Comparative Law at its meeting in Paris in August, 1954.
t Professor of law, Duke University School of Law, Durham, North Carolina.
1 Schatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings. ( 3 d Ed.) p. 268 ('953).
2 Britt, Blood Grouping Tests and the Law, 21 MhNN. LAW REv. 671, 697 (1937).
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the mass of able and lucid writings on the subject by American scien-
tists over the years, there appears little justification for including them
in the condemnation.
A sounder explanation would seem to be the lack in the United
States of liason between the legal and medical professions. If courts
are to keep pace with science, then they must be authoritatively ad-
vised of what science has to offer. Dean Roscoe Pound has long urged
the establishment in the United States of just such an agency, com-
posed of men of law and men of science, that would keep the bench
and bar abreast of new means of scientific proof.' European courts
have long enjoyed the benefits of such a system. Through Institutes
of Forensic Medicine, Medicolegal Councils, Ministries of Justice and
like agencies they promptly get expert and impartial guidance, often
by request, regarding the scientific reliability of proffered evidence.
This is what occurred in the matter of blood grouping tests, and in
large measure accounts for the early judicial recognition in Europe
of what has proved to be one of the most valuable discoveries of the
century in the medicolegal field.
American courts have had no such aid. Apart from legislation
they must get knowledge of such matters either through the process
of judicial knowledge or as a result of expert testimony in each par-
ticular case. The latter method is, of course, time consuming, and
may involve conflicting testimony by opposing experts. This means
that in each case where a party seeks to introduce and rely upon some
form of scientific evidence he must first produce experts in that field
who can satisfy the court of the scientific quality and reliability of
the offered evidence. Such a showing is subject to being rebutted.
Surprising as it may seem, in one reported case a physician testified
in 1935 in opposition to blood grouping tests that according to his
opinion such tests were not conclusive and their value was contro-
versial.' Some consolation is to be found in the fact that the court was
not impressed by this pseudo-expert.
The other method of getting scientific evidence before a court is
through the process of judicial notice, when the court is willing to hold
that the reliability of certain evidence is so well established and com-
monly recognized that formal proof of the scientific laws involved is
dispensed with. In Anglo-American jurisprudence judicial notice has
no clearly defined metes and bounds. It rests on judicial decison,
except in the comparatively few instances where statutes require the
courts to take judicial notice of particular facts.
It seems appropriate, therefore, in considering the attitude of
'Pound, A Ministry of Justice as a Means of Making Progress in Medicine Avail-
able to Courts and Legislatures, 1o UNIv. oF CHi. LAW REv. 323, (I943).
4 Com. v. Viscocki, 23 P. D. & C. 103 (1935).
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American courts toward evidence of blood grouping tests to start with
the problem of judicial notice. This is a primary question from the
point of view of the lawyer, for he must determine whether to go to
trial prepared to prove by experts the scientific reliability of blood
grouping tests in general and the natural laws applicable thereto, or
to run the risk of relying upon the court's judicially recognizing these
matters without proof. On this point there has existed considerable
confusion.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
It is generally said that "judicial notice will extend into the realm
of medical science to the extent that its dotrines are generally recog-
nized by the profession and the public."' The medical profession's
attitude toward blood grouping tests is objectively summed up in the
1952 report of the American Medical Association's Committee on
Medicolegal Problems appointed to survey the subject, which reads
in part as follows:
"During the past decade, as a result of the introduction of the Rh-Hr
tests, the usefulness of blood tests in medicolegal cases has been en-
hanced considerably. The chief application of the blood tests has been
in cases of disputed paternity involving babies born out of wedlock, but
the tests are also frequently applied in divorce actions, and occasionally
in cases of disputed maternity, as well as in instances of suspected inter-
change of infants in hospitals. When a man is falsely accused of pa-
ternity, he has better than a 5o% chance of being exonerated by the
combined use of the A-B-O, M-N and Rh-Hr tests, while more than
90% of cases of interchange of infants can be solved by such tests." 6
An earlier committee report submitted in I937 had taken an
equally definite stand on the scientific reliability of such tests as of
that date.7
Among laymen the subject matter has long since become a matter
of common knowledge, with the setting up of blood banks, continuing
blood donations, and routine blood transfusions. These were the con-
siderations which impelled the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia to extend judicial notice to the subject of blood grouping
tests in 1940.8
In the light of these well-known facts it would seem needless to
argue for judicial notice, and yet it is not many years since the Su-
preme Court of South Dakota, in the first case involving blood group-
ing tests to reach a court of last resort in the United States, held that
the trial judge, in a rape case wherein defendant denied paternity of
5 20 Am. JUR. III, EVmENcE, sec. 97.
6 149 JOUR. AM. MED. AssN., 699-7o6 (1952).
7 ]08 JoUR. AM. MED. ASSN., 2138-2142 (1937).
8 Beach v. Beach, 72 App. D.C. 318; 114 F.2d 479 (940).
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the child claimed by the prosecutrix to be the result of the rape, had
not erred in denying defendant's application for a blood grouping test,
'because, for one reason, the record failed to show general recognition
among experts of the reliability of the tests, such as was accorded, for
example, to identification by fingerprints. Defendant's conviction was
accordingly sustained.'
A remarkable aftermath of this case came in the Court's second
opinion handed down some two years later on petition for rehearing,
wherein appears the following emphatic language:
. . ."it is our considered opinion that the reliability of the blood test
is definitely and indeed unanimously established as a matter of expert
scientific opinion entertained by authorities in the field, and we think
the time has undoubtedly arrived when the results of such tests, made
by competent persons and properly offered in evidence, should be deemed
admissible in a court of justice wherever paternity is in issue." 1o
Despite this complete about-face on the point of judicial notice,
the Court nevertheless adhered to its former opinion of 1933 in sus-
taining defendant's conviction, largely upon the ground that at the
time of the trial in 1931 blood grouping tests had not then attained
sufficient scientific standing to require the trial court to accord judicial
notice thereto, although the Supreme Court had now in 1936 "by as-
sistance of able counsel and from our own subsequent investigations
arrived at a complete belief in such reliability."
Thus, somewhere between the years 1933 and 1936 the light of
knowledge had penetrated the judicial mind of South Dakota. It is
lamentable that in the interest of justice this after-acquired knowledge
did not lead the Court to think in terms of fairness to the accused
rather than of a techical ground for sustaining a trial judge. With
respect to this point it was clearly the duty of the Court in 1936 to
reverse the trial court, in the light of its then acquired judicial knowl-
edge. 1
The first reported case in the United States wherein evidence of
blood grouping tests was received appears to be that of Commonwealth
v. Zammarelli,1" a bastardy proceeding which came before a Penn-
sylvania court in 1931. Blood grouping tests were made by consent
of parties. After a proper foundation had been laid by expert testi-
mony as to the scientific nature and reliability of such tests, the re-
sults obtained were testified to by defendant's medical expert to the
effect that the blood of the prosecutrix was in group A, that of defen-
9 State v. Datum, 62 S.D. r23; 252 N.W. 7 (1933).
10 State v. Damm, 64 S.D. 309, 312; 266 N.W. 667, 668 (1936).
" Maguire, A Survey of Blood Group Decisions & Legislation, i6 Sou. CALIF. LAW
REV. x61, 173 (1943).
12 17 Pa. D.C. 229 (193i).
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dant in group 0, and that of the child in group B, so that by the law
of science, defendant could not possibly be the father of the child.
Despite this evidence the trial judge sustained the jury's verdict of
guilty. On appeal to the County Court this judgment was reversed
and a new trial ordered upon the ground that the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence. Here was an early recognition of the
force and effect of this type of evidence, but it is to be noted that it
was admitted only after foundation had been laid. No claim of ju-
dicial notice was advanced.
As late as i936 the Pennsylvania Superior Court expressly re-
fused to take judicial notice of the scientific reliability of blood group-
ing tests,18 and such appears to have been the holding of state courts
generally up to that year.
In January, 1936, a court of record in New York became the first
American tribunal to take judicial notice of the scientific nature of
blood grouping tests and of the natural laws applicable thereto.' This
New York decision was soon followed in the same year by the dictum
of the Supreme Court of South Dakota above quoted from the case of
State v. Damm.'5 In i937 the Court of Appeals of California, in a
case hereinafter to be considered on other points, became the second
court of record in the United States to hold that the scientific validity
of blood grouping tests should be judicially recognized." It thus ap-
pears that with the year 1936 courts in the United States began to open
their eyes and their minds to the long established facts concerning
blood grouping tests and the scientific laws related thereto. In ex-
planation of this changed attitude it is significant to note that the most
authoritative work on the subject in America was first published in
1935. Dr. A. S. Wiener's outstanding book, "Blood Groups and Blood
Transfusions," undoubtedly contributed more than any other factor
to this judicial enlightenment. Chapter i8 of that masterly work dealt
specifically with medicolegal application of blood groupings, and
served to dispel much of the inertia that so long obtained. Later edi-
tions have served to reinforce this effect.
The net result has been a growing recognition by American courts
of the nature of blood groupings and the laws of inheritance that
govern.'
Unfortunately, from time to time a discordant note has been
sounded. Thus the Court of Appeals of Ohio in 1939 expressly re-
jected the view that the results of blood grouping tests "established an
13 Com. v. English, 123 Pa. Super. x61; 186 Atl. 298 (r936).
14In re Swabn's Will, x58 Misc. Rep. 17; 285 N.Y. Supp. 234 (Jan. 27, 1936).
15 SUpra, note Nq
16 Arias v. Kale1tnikoff, 67 P.2d io59 (1937),.
17 Beach v. Beach, supra, note 8.
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immutable law of nature of which courts should take judicial notice." '1
This holding may be deemed rectified by a later decision of the Su-
preme Court of Ohio which in referring to the subject of blood group-
ing test evidence stated, "medical authorities agree on its accuracy and
reliability to establish non-paternity in the great majority of cases." "
It is to be noted that in 1939, shortly after the desision in the Holod
case, the Ohio legislature enacted a statute, hereinafter referred to,
providing for the admissibility of the results of blood grouping tests
as evidence of non-paternity, and thus in effect requiring some degree
of judicial recognition.
The hope that the question of judicial notice of blood grouping
tests had been settled in American courts was upset by a decision of
the Supreme Court of Iowa in I949 ."° In a bastardy proceeding the
defendant applied for an order to compel the parties to submit to blood
grouping tests. There was no statute in Iowa on the subject, and the
trial court denied the application. On appeal the Supreme Court sus-
tained the lower court, holding no error had been committed, since the
record showed no general scientific recognition of the value of the tests
nor sufficient general acceptance for general scientific recognition as
to be a matter of which the Court would take judicial notice. When an
eminent court such as the Supreme Court of Iowa takes such a po-
sition at this late date, one cannot but view with uncertainty and dis-
may the course that may be followed by the large number of state
courts which have yet to pass on this point. A settling of the matter
by statute would seem to be called for.
ADMISSIBILITY
The admissibility in a proper case of the results of blood group-
ing tests, either under judicial notice or after affirmative showing of
scientific reliability and acceptance, may now be regarded as upheld
in every American jurisdiction," although there have been a few er-
ratic decisions in the past. The Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York in 1934, in reversing a lower court's order requir-
ing the plaintiff mother and her child to submit to blood grouping tests
on the issue of defendant's paternity, bluntly said, "Plaintiff may sub-
mit or not to the taking of her own blood, but it plainly determines
nothing." 22 This and similar rulings in other early New York cases
were remedied by the enactment in New York in 193 5 of the first
18 State ex rel. v. Holod, 63 Ohio App. 16; 24 N.E. 2d 962 (939).
19 State ex rel. v. Clark, 144 Ohio St. 305; 58 N.E. 2d 773 (x944).
20 Dale v. Buckingham, 241 Iowa 40; 40 N.W. 2d 45 (1949).
21 1948 ANNUAL SURVEY OF Am. LAW, P. 899.
22 Beuschel v. Manowitz, 241 App. Div. 888; 272 N.Y.S. 165 (x934).
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statutory provision in this country making results of blood grouping
tests admissible in evidence.
In Pennsylvania, where no statute covered the matter until 1951,
the Superior Court of that State in 1943 sustained a lower court's re-
fusal to admit any evidence of the scientific validity of results of blood
grouping tests which were sought to be introduced in a bastardy pro-
ceeding to exclude defendant's paternity. To justify its ruling against
this scientific evidence the Court indulged in the following extraor-
dinary reasoning: "in such case the putative father would have every-
thing to gain and nothing to lose by the test, while the mother would
have everything to lose and nothing to gain by it." 23 In other words,
justice must give way to fair play for the mother of a bastard.
As indicated, statutes now cover the matter in New York and
Pennsylvania, and also in a number of other states. In a liberal opinion
the Wisconsin Supreme Court went so far as to reverse a conviction
in a bastardy case and to order a new trial where it appeared the blood
grouping tests exonerating the defendant had been ruled out by the
lower court for failure to meet certain technical requirements of the
statute of that State.24
It can now be said that wherever the question has arisen within
the past decade American courts have recognized the admissibility of
such evidence when relevant.2"
Blood grouping test evidence is deemed legally revelant and ad-
missible on two broad issues:
i. Parentage. This issue may arise in a variety of cases, either
of a civil or criminal nature. The most common are bastardy proceed-
ings. Other types are divorce or annulment actions, prosecutions for
non-support, proceedings to determine rights of inheritance, prosecu-
tions for rape, seduction or assault where a child is claimed to have
resulted from the wrongful act, proceedings to restore to their rightful
parents babies interchanged, and even suits to obtain declaratory judg-
ments. Relevancy of blood grouping test evidence in all such cases is
predicated on the fact that it may exclude although it cannot prove
parentage. This ruling results from the nature of blood groupings and
types, and the natural laws by which they are inherited. Since it has
been established that a child cannot possess agglutinogen A or B unless
it was present in the blood of one or both parents, and since a parent
of the AB group cannot have a child of the 0 group, and a group 0
parent can-not have a group AB child, it is possible by blood tests to
determine, for example, that a defendant charged with being the father
23 CoM. v. Krutsick, 15i Pa. Super. Ct. 164; 30 A.2d 325 (1943).
2 4 Euclide v. State, 231 Wis. 616; 286 N.W. 3 (1939).
25 Cuneo v. Cuneo. 96 N.Y.S. 2d 899 (195o). State v. Snyder, 157 Ohio St. 15; 104
N.E. 2d i69 (952).
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of a particular child could not possibly have sired it. A similar set of
natural laws applies with respect to the M-N and the Rh-Hr blood
factors.2" Paternity may thus be positively excluded by proper tests
for any of these factors, and when exclusion is so shown, such fact is
conclusive of the issue, according to the scientific view.
Where paternity is not thus excluded, this simply means that the
defendant is merely one of the millions of men who could have fathered
the child. In such cases the probative force and effect is deemed too
slight to render the evidence admissible as tending affirmatively to
establish paternity, especially when the natural result would be to mis-
lead the jury and unduly to prejudice the defendant.27
The foregoing is but a summary of the general attitude of Ameri-
can courts on this point. It means that the man disclaiming paternity
can introduce evidence of blood grouping tests which exclude the pos-
sibility of his paternity, while the mother cannot introduce evidence of
tests which fail to exclude and show only the possibility of his pa-
ternity. A corollary to all of this is that the mother has no standing
to demand blood grouping tests, for if they exclude the man's paternity,
they are no part of her case; while if they do not exclude, the evidence
is still inadmissible for the reason stated. Ta In short, such evidence
may be used as a shield but not as a sword, and usually only by the
man.
A unique situation was presented in an Ohio case2" where the
court did permit a mother to resort to blood grouping test evidence in
a bastardy proceeding. The prosecutrix was married at the time the
child was conceived, but was subsequently divorced by her husband.
She then instituted a bastardy proceeding against another man who
she charged was the father of her illegitimate child. The defendant
claimed that the child was the lawful offspring of the former husband.
To rebut this charge the prosecutrix offered expert evidence of blood
grouping tests of herself, her child, and her former husband, showing
that the last named could not be the child's father. In holding this
evidence to have been properly admitted the Court said: "She was
charging another than her former husband with the paternity of her
child, conceived while she was still married, and it was essential as a
part of her case to exclude her former husband as the father." It is
worthy of note that such was the Court's ruling in spite of the fact
that the case did not fall under the Ohio statute making blood group-
26 The first reported American case recognizing the scientific validity of the Rh-Hr
test appears to be Saks v. Saks, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 797 (1947).
27 Flippen v. Meinhold, 282 N.Y.S. 444 (1935).
27a State ex rel. v. Brigham, 72 S.D. 278; 33 N.W. 2d 285 (1948). State ex rel.
v. Morris, 156 Ohio St. 333; 102 N.E. 2d 450 (1951). Roberts v. Van Cleave, 205 Okla.
319; 237 P.2d 892 (1951).
28 State ex rel. v. Clark, 144 Ohio St. 305; 58 N.E. 2d 773 (1944).
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ing tests receivable in evidence. That statute, like those of several
states, was poorly drawn in that its scope was limited as shown by the
opening language: "Whenever it shall be relevant to the defense in a
bastardy proceeding the trial court, on motion of the defendant, shall
order that the complainant, her child and the defendant submit to one
or more blood grouping tests," etc. Although the statute did not here
apply, the Court properly held the evidence admissible on general prin-
ciples of relevancy on this collateral issue of paternity.
2. Identity. In his book, already referred to, Dr. Wiener adverts
to the relevancy of this type of evidence on the issue of identity and
as establishing a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence of guilt
or innocence in a criminal case:
"Blood grouping can be used to prove that a given blood stain could not
have come from a certain individual, namely, when the blood stain is
of a group different from that of the person from whom it is supposedly
derived. On the other hand, the fact that the blood stain is of the same
group as that of given individual is of course no proof that the blood
came from that individual. Nevertheless, such information may be of
value as confirmatory circumstantial evidence. . . . Hence, blood
grouping tests may help not only to acquit the innocent but also to
convict the guilty." 29
Professor Maguire has well pointed out that there exists in Amer-
ican legislation a mistaken policy of restricting such evidence to fili-
ation proceedings. He rightly insists that its use ought not to be con-
fined to any particular tribunal or kind of litigation, but it should be
admissible on issues other than parentage, "according to the general
rules of courtroom logic," subject to any applicable exclusionary
rules. 0
Appellate courts in several states have adopted this broad policy.
A leading recent case comes from the Court of Appeals of Maryland."'
In a prosecution for rape the Court held admissible the testimony of
an expert, based on blood grouping tests, that blood taken from the
coat of the defendant could not have come from a third person as
claimed by the defendant, but was of the same type as that of the
victim and that found at the scene of the crime. This evidence was
held relevant as tending to impeach defendant's testimony, to corrobo-
rate the prosecutrix and to support the inference of defendant's guilt.
The Court emphasized the familiar rule that the objection as to re-
moteness went to the weight and not to the admissibility of such cir-
cumstantial evidence. The Maryland statute, like that of Ohio, applied
29 Weiner, Blood Groups and Blood Transfusions (3d Ed.)'p. 399 (I945).
30 Maguire, supra note I', P. 173.
31 Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 640; 45 A.2d 85 (1945).
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only to blood grouping tests "in bastardy proceedings where the de-
fendant denies he is the father of the child." In answer to the con-
tention that this statute limited the use of blood grouping tests to bas-
tardy cases the Court said: "The Maryland statute does not purport
to establish a universal rule of evidence, and has no application what-
ever in other classes of cases." In a later Maryland case 2 this hold-
ing was followed in a prosecution for murder wherein expert testimony
as to blood grouping tests was admitted to show that the type of blood
found on defendant's clothing was different from his own, but was the
same as that of the victim. The opinion in the Shanks case is a com-
prehensive one. It surveys the history and nature of blood grouping
tests, and reviews numerous cases decided in this country and abroad.
The Court explicitly states that "blood types are now matters of com-
mon or ordinary knowledge," and thus affords judicial notice to the
validity of such evidence.
At an earlier date the Supreme Court of Florida, in a murder
case,3" held admissible expert testimony as to blood grouping tests
showing that blood found on defendant's trousers was not the same as
that of defendant, but was the same as that of the victim. Florida had
no statute relating to blood grouping tests.
In a quite recent case the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held
admissible, in a prosecution for rape, evidence of blood grouping tests
showing that blood stains on the seat of defendant's car and on the
victim's jacket were of the same type as defendant's and different from
that of the victim.34
No case has been found which denies the admissibility of blood
grouping test evidence on the issue of identity where relevant. It thus
appears that American courts, regardless of statute, have readily re-
ceived such evidence as circumstantial proof of guilt in criminal cases.
It would, of course, be equally available to the defendant in an appro-
priate case to establish his innocence.
WEIGHT
The most controversial question that has arisen on this entire
subject in American courts concerns the weight to be given to results
of blood grouping tests disproving parentage, after they have been ad-
mitted in evidence.
One line of American authority treats such evidence simply as
expert opinion to be weighed by the trier of fact together with all other
32 Davis v. State, 189 Md. 640; 57 A.2d 289 (ig48).
33 Williams v. State, 143 Fla. 826; 397 So. 562 (3940).
34 Com. v. Statti, 1i6 Pa. Super. 577; 73 A.2d 688 (195o).
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evidence in the case. Until recent years this was regarded as the estab-
lished American doctrine, despite strong adverse criticism by legal
writers. 5
Of late there has appeared a disposition on the part of a few ap-
pellate courts to follow the European view and to treat the results of
such tests as.conclusive where they exclude parentage, provided no
valid question is raised as to their accuracy.
The leading case in support of the orthodox view is a decision by
the Supreme Court of California in a case wherein the defendant was
adjudged to be the father of plaintiff's illegitimate child, notwithstand-
ing the fact that unimpeached blood grouping tests excluded pater-
nity."6 In reaching this result the Supreme Court overruled the inter-
mediate Court of Appeals which had held such scientific evidence to
be conclusive and to render nugatory all evidence offered by the
mother. Thus the judgment of the trial court, holding that other evi-
dence in the record was sufficient to overcome the scientific evidence
and to establish defendant's paternity,, was reinstated by the Supreme
Court. The decision was adversely criticized throughout the country,
but was adhered to when a few years later the same question arose in
another case which attracted widespread attention because of the no-
toriety of the parties involved. "7 The Court here allowed to stand a
judgment that one Charles Chaplin was the father of plaintiff's illegiti-
mate child, even though blood grouping tests made by consent of par-
ties excluded such a possibility. In a more recent case California has
reaffirmed the holding in the Chaplin case.38
The appellate courts of Ohio are in accord with the California
decisions. In a case hereinbefore cited on another point the Supreme
Court of Ohio said the testimony of experts who made the blood group-
ing tests was "admissible for whatever weight it might be given in
establishing" non-paternity, but was not conclusive evidence thereof.
This statement was in line with an earlier decision by the intermediate
Court of Appeals of Ohio wherein it was expressly held that blood
grouping test evidence was not conclusive, but was to be admitted on
the same footing as other evidence for consideration by the jury, the
Court saying: "The results of blood tests, by reason of their involved
experimentation, have no greater claim to credibility than other evi-
3 5 Maguire, supra note ii, P. 166. 39 CALnf. LAW REV. 279 (95). 25 IA. LAW
REV. 823 (1940). 163 A.L.R. 960 (1946).
36Arias v. Kalensnikoff, zo Calif. 2d 428; 74 P.2d zo43 (1937).
37 Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Calif. App. 2d 652; 169 P.2d 442 (1946). Petition for re-
hearing by Supreme Court denied, July 24, 3946.
38 Hill v. Johnson, 102 Calif. App. 2d 94; 226 P.2d 655 (1951).
39 State ex rel. v. Clark, supra note x9.
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dence." 4 This decision also has been the subject of much adverse
comment. "
One of the latest reported cases in the United States on the sub-
ject of blood grouping test evidence is that decided by the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire on March 2, 1954.42 This was a petition
to vacate a decree annulling petitioner's marriage to the man she
claimed was the father of her child. In the lower court blood grouping
tests were made by consent of parties. The results of the tests satisfied
the expert that paternity was excluded, and he so reported. On con-
sideration of this and other oral evidence the trial court denied the
petition and found in favor of the putative father on the issue of pa-
ternity. Since the exclusion rested alone on a test for the recently dis-
covered blood factor S, as to which widespread genetic data has not
yet been collected, the expert qualified his earlier report that pater-
nity was excluded beyond a reasonable doubt by stating that it was
his personal professional opinion that paternity was excluded by the
S test, the evidentiary value of which he nevertheless asserted was
greater than any other that might be made in this case. On appeal the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire sustained the lower court. The
opinion fully recognizes the admissibility and relevancy of blood
grouping test evidence. The court took pains to point out that it was
unnecessary to decide whether in this case such evidence should be
deemed conclusive, but it did make the following significant observa-
tion: "In this respect the blood grouping tests were like other expert
opinion evidence and entitled to such weight as the trial Court wished
to give them." Whether the Court would hold the exclusionary results
to be conclusive, or that they were made conclusive by a recent statute
(hereinafter cited, and enacted after this case was decided), if those
questions were being litigated, does not appear. On its face this dictum
would seem to align New Hampshire with California and Ohio in the
view that such evidence is not to be deemed conclusive, but is to be
weighed with other evidence in the case.
It was not until i949 that advocates of the rule of conclusiveness
actually got support from a court of last resort, although many in-
ferior courts are reported as regularly treating such evidence as con-
clusive where parentage has been excluded.43 In a leading case44 the
Supreme Court of Maine handed down its much heralded opinion
which in effect overruled a prior case and expressly held that a jury's
finding of paternity contrary to the results of unimpeached blood
grouping tests must be set aside. In the view of this Court the only
40 State ex reL. v. Holod, supra note i8.
41 Schatkin, op. cit. note 1, p. 242. 25 IA. LAW REV. 823 (1940).
42 Groulx v. Groulx, 103 A.2d i88 (1954).
43 Schatkin, op. cit. note i, p. 238. Unger, 152 JoUR. Am. MED. AssN., ioo6 (953).
44 Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351; 69 A.2d 67o (1949).
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function of the jury where such evidence is introduced is to determine
whether the tests have been properly made, and the jury will not be
permitted to find against the tests excluding paternity when there is
no believable evidence showing them to have been inaccurately per-
formed. This decision was generally approved as marking a turning
point in the long drawn out struggle for proper recognition of this form
of scientific evidence. 5
The only other state appellate court that has thus far expressed
a concurring view is the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York. While this is not a court of last resort, it does rank next
to the Court of Appeals which is the highest court of that State. In
1950 the Appellate Division had before it an appeal in a bastardy case
wherein the trial court had adjudged defendant to be the father of a
child, despite evidence of results of two blood grouping tests definitely
excluding his paternity. The trial court had ruled that such evidence
was a mere expression of medical opinion entitled to no greater weight
than is awarded opinion testimony generally. The Appellate Division
reversed and ordered a new trial.46 The opinion states that the basic
question is what weight should be given to evidence of blood grouping
tests excluding paternity. The Court pointed out that here the evi-
dence of the tests consisted merely of the unsworn reports filed in the
lower court without any supporting testimony as to their accuracy or
as to the scientific basis for the indicated findings. After citing with
approval the Maine case of Jordan v. Mace the Court said: "If, as
appellant contends, it is a scientifically established and accepted fact
that an exclusionary finding is conclusive as to non-paternity, it should
be recognized and given effect. In such case the courts should accept
the decisiveness of a non-paternity finding properly arrived at as it
would accept the demonstrable fact that a mixture of blue and yellow
colors will produce varying shades of green, but never a red color."
The case was remanded for a new trial in order to afford the parties
opportunity to introduce competent evidence on the accuracy of the
tests and the scientific basis for their conclusiveness.
While this opinion was highly satisfactory to advocates of the doc-
trine of conclusiveness, it is indeed unfortunate that the Court should
have gone so far as to indicate that it did not take judicial notice of
the scientific bases for the conclusiveness of blood grouping tests ex-
cluding parentage. This latter feature of the opinion so disturbed one
member of the Court that he filed a separate concurring opinion in an
effort to set the matter right, as follows:
"Courts may not ignore the universal scientific opinion that such tests,
resulting in exclusion, are, in fact, conclusive on the issue of paternity.
45 39 CALmF. LAW REV. 280 (195). 3 BOSTON UNIV. LAW REV. 444 (195o).
46 Comm. v. Costonie, 97 N.YS. 2d 8o4 (195o).
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. . . Such scientific exclusion, should, assuming the tests to have been
competently and accurately made, be accepted by the trial court, not-
withstanding the strength, as in this case, of the nonscientific testimony
to the contrary. There should be no occasion for expert testimony in
every case to prove the scientific validity of blood grouping tests result-
ing in exclusion of paternity. The scientific opinion on that point is so
general that courts may take judicial notice of it in filiation proceedings."
With judicial authority so hopelessly divided on the vital question
of the weight to be given evidence of blood grouping tests excluding
parentage, it is pertinent to look to the opinions of the two professions,
law and medicine, which are most directly involved. One would expect
to find the medical profession championing the scientific viewpoint
and insisting on the rule of conclusiveness. On the other hand, the
legal profession might reasonably be expected to uphold the right of
courts to administer the fact finding process without wholly surrender-
ing to determinative laws claimed to be known to the scientists.
Here is to be found a strange paradox, for it is a representative
group of the legal profession in the United States that argues for the
rule of conclusiveness with respect to this type of evidence, while
leaders of the medical profession seem to assert a contrary view.
For some years the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, an
important and highly esteemed body made up of outstanding members
of the legal profession from each state, have been engaged in formu-
lating a uniform statute on the subject of blood grouping tests to be
recommended for adoption by all the states. After long and careful
deliberations the Commissioners promulgated such a uniform act in
i9 5 2." This proposed statute will be hereinafter more fully consid-
ered. The point here to be noted is that by section 4 of the uniform
act results of blood grouping tests performed by court appointed ex-
perts are made conclusive when all the experts agree that parentage is
excluded. The Commissioners preface the act with an explanatory
statement wherein they undertake to justify this innovation, for such
it is, since no state has as yet gone so far as to embody the rule of con-
clusiveness in its statute relating to blood grouping tests.. In conclud-
ing their argument the Commissioners state:
"In this kind of situation it seems intolerable for a court to permit an
opposite result to be reached when the judgment may scientifically be
one of complete accuracy. For a court to permit the establishment of
paternity in cases where it is scientifically impossible to arrive at that
result would seem to be a great travesty on justice. . . . A statute upon
the subject ought to take into account the situation of certainty and
make the medical testimony final as against all other testimony when
nonpaternity is scientifically proved." 48
47 x952 HANDBOOK, NATL. Coxr. CoMM. ON UNxoRM STATE LAWS, P. 444.
48 952 iHANDBOOK, etc., supra note 47, P. 435.
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This carefully considered statement by leaders of the American
Bar, taken together with numerous articles in legal journals, discloses
that the legal profession in the United States, as a whole, wants this
type of evidence made conclusive.
In the same year, 1952, the American Medical Association's Com-
mittee on Medicolegal Problems published its report hereinbefore re-
ferred to.4" That Committee was composed of three top ranking ex-
perts in the field, Dr. A. S. Wiener, Dr. Phillip Levine and Dr. Israel
Davidsohn. In discussing the use of blood grouping tests in the courts
the report states in part:
"While the results of the blood tests are admissible when they exclude
paternity, the findings are not binding on the courts. This is as it should
be. It is the duty of the court to examine the evidence in order to con-
vince itself that the tests have been properly carried out. . . . In divorce
and separation actions the court often takes into account other consid-
erations aside from the scientific results of the blood tests. To base de-
cisions entirely on the results of the blood tests in such cases may harm
an innocent third party by bastardizing the child. For this reason in a
number of cases the court has refused to grant a divorce on the basis of
blood tests alone."
While this quotation may be susceptible of a different interpre-
tation, it was promptly seized upon by at least one court as a recog-
nition by the medical profession of the indecisive character of blood
grouping tests excluding parentage. The case was a bastardy proceed-
ing which came before the Superior Court of New Jersey.50 As stated
by that Court the question was whether "the result of a blood grouping
test disproving paternity was to be treated as a form of expert evidence
not necessarily barring a finding of paternity contrary to the test re-
sult, or was it to be considered conclusive evidence of nonpaternity."
In answering this question the Superior Court held that the blood
grouping test negativing paternity was a fact scientifically established,
as much so as that the "world is round," and as such it should be ac-
cepted by courts of law as final regardless of other evidence in the case.
On appeal to the Appellate Division, which is a court ranking next to
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, it was ruled that results of blood
grouping tests excluding paternity were not conclusive. 1 The Court
cited the report of the American Medical Association's Committee
above referred to, and quoted the excerpt above set out with the fol-
lowing statement:
"In view of the acknowledgment of the above mentioned possible excep-
tions, it cannot be said that the results of the blood grouping tests ex-
cluding paternity are conclusive."
49 Supra note 6.
50 Brown v. Marx, 21 N.J. Super. 9g; go A.2d 545 (952).
51 Brown v. Marx, 24 N.J. Super. 25; 93 A.2d 597 ('952).
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Although the Appellate Division sustained the lower court's judg-
ment for the defendant, it did so upon the ground that other evidence
in the case together with the medical testimony warranted the finding
of nonpaternity.
This quick reaction to the report of the American Medical Associ-
ation's Committee brought New Jersey into line with those jurisdic-
tions opposed to the rule of conclusiveness.
It is worthy of note that another leading medical authority, Dr.
L. J. Unger, makes a statement somewhat similar to that of the Com-
mittee, in an article on blood grouping tests published in 1953:
"The tests may exclude paternity but can never prove it. While the
results of an exclusion are admissible in evidence they are not necessarily
binding on the court." 52
It appears, therefore, that to the contrariety of judicial opinion
there is to be added the oddly opposing views of the legal and medical
professions on the question of policy with respect to this problem of
weight. It is understandable, then, why there should be an increasing
demand for legislation on the subject. How far legislative enactment
may supply a solution will be considered in the next section.
LEGISLATION
By the year i953 eleven states had enacted diverse statutes au-
thorizing courts to order blood grouping tests and making the results
admissible in evidence.53 In addition, the Federal courts had been held
to have like authority under rule 35(a) of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure."
While it is not feasible to consider these statutes in detail, certain
general observations should be made.
Most of the statutes purport to apply only to litigation involving
the issue of parentage, and usually only to filiation proceedings. All
provide that the tests may be had on court order, which provision was
deemed necessary because from time to time some courts had held that
under common law principles they could not order such tests without
legislative authority. Even with legislative authority the constitutional
question has been raised whether a person can be required to submit
to blood grouping tests when the evidence thus derived might tend to
incriminate him or violate other constitutional rights. Until quite re-
cently it was fairly established that the constitutional protection
against self-incrimination applies only to situations where one is made
52 Unger, supra note 43.
r3New York (1935), Wisconsin (1935), South Dakota (1939), New Jersey (1939),
Ohio ('939), Maine (939), Maryland (1941), North Carolina (1945), Pennsylvania
(951), Nevada (i95i), and Indiana (1953).
54 Beach v. Beach, supra note 8.
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to give testimonial evidence against himself, and hence requiring the
giving up of a drop of blood is not a violation of this or cognate con-
stitutional guaranties.55 Considerable doubt has now been raised on
this point by a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. 6
A majority of the Court, in reversing the Supreme Court of California,
held it to be a denial of due process for a state court to admit in evi-
dence in a prosecution for unlawful possession of narcotics, capsules
forcibly extracted from defendant's stomach by use of a stomach
pump. While the opinion purports not to condemn the "use of modern
methods and devices for discovering wrongdoers," it does not spe-
cifically exempt from its proscription the forcible extraction of blood.
It is significant that Justice Black concurred in the result upon the
broad ground that the defendant had been compelled to furnish evidence
against himself, saying, "I think a person is compelled to be a witness
against himself not only when he is compelled to testify, but also when
as here incriminating evidence is forcibly taken from him by a con-
trivance of modern science." Justice Jackson, also concurring in the
result, was even more explicit in stating, "But I think that words taken
from his lips, capsules taken from his stomach, blood taken from his
veins are all inadmissible provided they are taken from him without
his consent. They are inadmissible because of the command of the
Fifth Amendment." If the full import of this decision is to be fol-
lowed, then in a simple bastardy proceeding, although it is the putative
father who consents to and usually demands the test, the mother may
justifiably decline to give her blood, since a result disproving defend-
ant's paternity might expose her to a prosecution for perjury. All the
more so may a defendant in a criminal case refuse to submit to a test
when it is sought by the state as circumstantial evidence of guilt. If
this be the law, then under the American constitutional system statutes
and court orders are ineffective to compel submission to blood group-
ing tests in many instances. Already this holding by the highest court
in the land has given rise to a split in at least one state supreme court.5"
In six of the eleven states listed the only statutory sanctions for
enforcing court orders for blood grouping tests are provisions that re-
fusal to submit to the test may, in the discretion of the court, be dis-
closed to the jury, and in Maryland may also be commented on in
argument. The other five state statutes have no express provision on
the subject. Whether the sanctions that are expressly provided are to
be deemed exclusive, or whether a court's general power to compel
compliance with its order by contempt proceedings or otherwise is to
55State v. Cram, r77 Ore. 576; x6o P.2d 283; x64 A.L.R. 952 ('945). Com. v.
Statti, supra note 34.
56 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205 (1952).
57 Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36; 240 P.2d 512 (1952).
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be read into these statutes, is not altogether clear. In a Pennsylvania
case which arose before any statutory enactment in that State, the
Superior Court held that while a court might refuse to allow a bas-
tardy, case of a civil nature to proceed until the plaintiff mother sub-
mitted to the blood grouping test, such procedure could not be followed
in a criminal prosecution, since there the state is the party plaintiff,
and to stay or dismiss the proceedings because of a recalcitrant prose-
cutrix would defeat law enforcement. 8 In a recent New Jersey case
the plaintiff mother sought a decree for support of herself and her
child. The husband defended on the ground that he was not the child's
father, and moved for an order compelling a blood grouping test, since
plaintiff had refused to submit voluntarily. The trial court for some
undisclosed reason denied the motion for the test, and the defendant
appealed. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court, holding
that the denial of defendant's motion for a blood grouping test was an
abuse of discretion. 9 In answering plaintiff's contention that since the
applicable New Jersey blood grouping test statute provided no sanc-
tion for refusal to submit to an order for the test, she was at liberty
to refuse or consent as she saw fit, the Court held that the failure of
the statute to set out sanctions reflected a legislative intent that the
court in civil actions should have authority to enforce obedience to its
orders "by appropriate and familiar sanctions." This would seem to be
the law in civil proceedings and in any situation where constitutional
protections are not violated by compelling the test. A mild sanction
that may not do violence to the fundamental law is the one adopted in
the six states allowing the fact of refusal to submit to a blood grouping
test to be shown at the trial. Maguire advocates making one who re-
fuses to submit to tests subject "to contempt process or other appro-
priate sanction, including nonsuit or default, continuance, and adverse
comment to and inference by the trier of fact," "0 and this may well be
read into the statutes, subject to constitutional limitations.
A common provision in these statutes is one making results of
blood grouping tests admissible only where definite exclusion of par-
entage is shown. This follows the reasoning hereinbefore set out with
respect to relevancy. However, two of the eleven states, North Caro-
lina and South Dakota, have no such express limitation in their stat-
utes. While there is no decision in point in North Carolina, it has been
expressly held in South Dakota that even without such statutory limi-
tations the putative father cannot be compelled to submit to blood
grouping tests at the instance of the mother, since she could not intro-
58 Corn. v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 16x; 186 A. 298 (1936).
59 Cortese v. Cortese, io N.J. Super. 152; 76 A.2d 717 (195o).
60 Maguire, supra note x1, p. 174.
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duce the results in evidence as proof of paternity."' All authorities,
both legal and medical, have long agreed that the science of blood
grouping tests has not yet progressed to the point where it can affirma-
tively prove parentage.62
As earlier pointed out not one of these eleven statutes undertakes
to make the results of blood grouping tests excluding parentage con-
clusive of that issue.
It now remains to consider the important statute promulgated
in 1952 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and officially
known as the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity.
Backed as it is by high authority and prestige, it will have a marked
influence on future legislation on the subject in the United States. Be-
cause of the important role it will play, and to facilitate reference to
certain of its provisions, the pertinent text of the statute is here set out:
Section i. Authority for Test. In a civil action in which paternity is
a relevant fact, the court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made
by or on behalf of any person whose blood is involved may, or upon
motion of any party to the action made at a time so as not to delay the
proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child and alleged father to
submit to blood tests. If any party refuses to submit to such tests, the
court may resolve the question of paternity against such party or en-
force its order if the rights of others and the interests of justice so
require.
Section 2. Selection of Experts. The tests shall be made by experts
qualified as examiners of blood types who shall be appointed by the
Court. The experts shall be called by the court as witnesses to testify
to their findings and shall be subject to cross-examination by the parties.
Any party or person at whose suggestion the tests have been ordered
may demand that other experts, qualified as examiners of blood types,
perform independent tests under order of court, the results of which may
be offered in evidence. The number and qualifications of such experts
shall be determined by the court.
Section 3. Compensation of Expert Witnesses. The compensation of
each expert witness appointed by the court shall be fixed at a reasonable
amount. It shall be paid as the court shall order. The court may order
that it be paid by the parties in such proportions and at such times as it
shall prescribe, or that the proportion of any party be paid by [insert
name of the proper public authority], and that, after payment by the
parties or [insert name of the public authority] or both, all or part or
none of it to be taxed as costs in the action. The fee of an expert wit-
ness called by a party but not appointed by the court shall be paid by
the party calling him but shall not be taxed as costs in the action.
Section 4. Effect of Test Results. If the court find that the con-
clusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the
tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of the child, the ques-
tion of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree
01 State ex rel. v. Brigham, 72 S.D. 278; 33 N.W. 2d z85 (1948).
62 1948 ANN. SURVEY, etc., supra note 21.
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in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all
the evidence. If the experts conclude that the blood tests show the pos-
sibility of the alleged father's paternity, admission of this evidence is
within the discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency of the
blood type.
Section 5. Effect on Presumption of Legitimacy. The presumption
of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is overcome if the court
finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence
based upon the tests, show that the husband is not the father of the child.
Section 6. Applicability to Criminal Actions. This act shall apply
to criminal cases subject to the following limitations and provisions:
(a) an order for the tests shall be made only upon application of a party
or on the court's initiative; (b) the compensation of the experts shall
be paid by [insert name of proper public authority] under order of
court; (c) the court may direct a verdict of acquittal upon the con-
clusions of all the experts under the provisions of Section 4, otherwise
the case shall be submitted for determination upon all the evidence.
During the year i953 this Uniform Act was promptly enacted
into law by the legislatures of California, Oregon and New Hampshire,
with certain deletions in the two first-named states.
By its terms the Uniform Act applies to civil and criminal cases
"in which paternity is a relevant fact." In line with authority herein-
before cited this should not be taken to preclude the introduction of
such evidence where relevant on the issue of identity.
Sanctions provided include authority to resolve the question of
paternity against the refusing party, and also the general power of the
court to enforce its order by contempt proceedings "if the rights of
others and the interests of justice so require." This sweeping power
may well raise the constitutional questions posed by the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States above referred to.6
One of the most striking innovations in the Uniform Act is found
in the last sentence of section 4 which reads as follows: "If the ex-
perts conclude that the blood tests show the possibility of the alleged
father's paternity, admission of this evidence is within the discretion
of the court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood type." This
provision is supported by no legislative, scientific or appellate court
authority in the United States, as the Commissioners frankly admit."
Their decision to permit the introduction of such evidence, in the dis-
cretion of the courts, is predicated upon the idea that with the advance-
ment of scientific knowledge in this area rare blood types or factors
have been or may be discovered which if found in the blood of a child
and of its putative father may be relevant as circumstantial evidence
of paternity. The trouble with this view would seem to be that it is
running ahead of scientific opinion. The 1952 report of the American
63 Rochin v. California, supra note 56.
64 1952 HANDBoox, etc., supra note 47, P. 431.
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Medical Association's Committee65 emphatically states: "Since the
tests can be used only to exclude paternity and cannot be used to prove
paternity, to avoid misunderstanding the tests should be admissible as
evidence only where they exclude paternity." How conservative and
guarded are leading scientists in this field with regard to the use of
this type of evidence is strikingly brought out in the very recent, New
Hampshire cases above cited.66 From the Court's opinion it appears
that Dr. Wiener had remonstrated with the expert in that case who
had reported a positive exclusion of paternity based on a test for the
newly discovered and rare S blood factor. As a result of Dr. Wiener's
protest, this expert modified his statement considerably. If a test for
this rare blood factor is an insecure basis for a scientist's opinion ex-
cluding paternity, it would seem to be all the more unreliable as a basis
for lay. opinion in finding paternity. It is significant that the legisla-
ture of California in adopting the Uniform Act last year took pains to
omit the last sentence of section 4.67 However, this provision is now
law in Oregon and New Hampshire, and in fairness it must be said that
Schatkin reports three cases in trial courts in New York where evi-
dence of certain extremely rare blood factors in the blood of the child
and of the putative father was admitted as circumstantial evidence of
paternity."8 In none of those cases was the admissibility of such evi-
dence actually litigated.
The remaining and vital innovation in the Uniform Act is found
in the first sentence of section 4, which provides that if the court finds
the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based
upon the tests, to be in agreement in excluding paternity, the issue
shall be resolved accordingly. This legislative fiat goes even further
than the holding in Jordan v. Mace, 9 in that if all the experts agree
in their conclusions excluding paternity, by this statute the court must
so find, even though on cross-examination or otherwise facts be
brought out which discredit the accuracy of the tests. In such circum-
stances even Jordan v. Mace would permit the jury to pass on the ac-
curacy of the tests and find against them. By the Uniform Act the
agreement of the experts is made final, and they are made the triers
of fact.
An even more serious difficulty is thus involved. Under the
American constitutional doctrines of the separation of powers, the ju-
dicial department of government is vested with authority inherent in
the judicial process to determine controverted issues of 'fact arising in
65 Supra, note 6.
66 Groulh v. Groulh, supra note 42.
6T CALIp. CODE CIr. PRO., Sec. ig8o.6.
68 Schatkin, op. cit. note 1, p. 496, 497.
69 Supra note 44.
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litigation. This is fortified by the express constitutional guaranty of
right of trial by jury, that is, the right of a litigant to have such issues
of fact passed upon by a jury functioning under direction of the ju-
diciary. This means that it is beyond the province of the legislative
department to decree findings of fact. A brief statement of this recog-
nized principle is set forth in a leading authority, as follows:
"Statutes which declare one fact conclusive evidence of another material
fact in controversy are unconstitutional if the former is not, in and of it-
self, by virtue of its own force, conclusive. This rule although frequently
applied in criminal cases, is not limited to such cases but applies to civil
cases as well. Such statutes violate the due process clause of the Con-
stitution." 70
The late Dean Wigmore has stated the same rule in his authori-
tative work on the law of Evidence in the following words:
"It is one thing for the Judiciary, while exercising in its own way its
constitutional powers, to choose to accept the aid of an official certificate
in reaching its determination, but it is quite a different thing for the
Judiciary to be forbidden altogether to exercise its power in a certain
class of cases. The judicial function under the Constitution is to apply
the law in controverted cases; to apply the law necessarily involves the
investigation of evidence as a basis for that determination. To forbid
investigation is to forbid the exercise of an indestructible judicial func-
tion. Hence, to make a rule of conclusive evidence, compulsory upon the
Judiciary, is to attempt an infringement upon their exclusive prov-
ince." 71
It is recognized, of course, that within reasonable bounds the
legislature may make proof of one fact prima facie or presumptive evi-
dence of another fact, and thus shift the burden of going forward with
evidence to one party or the other. This is but a procedural device,
and court procedure is in large degree a subject of legislative regula-
tion. Furthermore, some such statutes may be sustained when in effect
they are but altering or laying down a rule of substantive law.
But it is an entirely different matter when the legislature under-
takes to say to a judicial tribunal that in deciding a disputed issue of
fact in litigation it must accept testimony of designated witnesses as
conclusive proof of such fact. If this can be done, then the legislature
has arrogated to itself one of the basic functions of a court. Under
the American constitutional system such usurpation is not allowed.
No one will dispute the propriety and desirability of courts treat-
ing unimpeached and accredited scientific evidence as conclusive proof
of the facts established according to recognized natural laws, but this
is a matter for judicial determination and not for legislative edict, ac-
cording to fundamental principles of American constitutional law. If
70 20 Am. JuR. III, EVIDENCE, Sec. io.
71 IV WInmonx ON EVIDENCE, 3d Ed., Sec. 1353 (1940).
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the legislature can compel a court to accept the testimony of an expert
or set of experts on a particular fact as conclusively establishing such
fact, then the court ceases to be a fact finding tribunal.
This is a question which the Commissioners failed to consider in
their prefatory note. That it calls for consideration is shown by the
authorities above quoted and by the numerous cases cited by them
which have held unconstitutional statutes undertaking to do just what
the Uniform Act at this point seeks to do.
By established American constitutional principles if the rule of
conclusiveness of blood grouping test evidence excluding paternity is
to be adopted, this must be accomplished by judicial decision and not
by legislative enactment. This calls for education of the judiciary, and
carries us back to Dean Pound's eminently sound proposal cited at the
beginning of this paper. If scientific evidence is to make real progress
in American courts, there must be made available to our courts an
authoritative source of scientific knowledge.
